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Legal reform has been a prominent point on the agenda since Xi Jinpingtook over the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). (1) Atthe Third Plenum of the Party’s 18th National Congress in 2013, Xi pro-
posed comprehensively pursuing four strategic political goals under the slo-
gan “Four Comprehensives” (sige quanmian 四個全面). Two of the political
goals, namely, to “comprehensively strengthen discipline of the Party”
(quanmian congyan zhidang 全面從嚴治黨) and to “comprehensively rule
the country according to the law” (quanmian yifa zhiguo 全面依法治國),
set the grounds for the latest round of legal reform.
The Central Leading Group for Deepening Overall Reform (Zhongyang
quanmian shenhua gaige lingdao xiaozu 中央全面深化改革領導小組) was
set up to carry out the “Four Comprehensives.” Deepening judicial reform in
the direction of building a just and efficient judiciary that the citizens can
trust is regarded as an integral part of the plan to comprehensively rule the
country according to the law. (2) In fact, 13 out of the 19 plenary sessions of
the Leading Group involved the topic of judicial reform from 2014 to 2015. (3)
The call for “ruling the country according to the law” can be dated back
to September 1997, when Jiang Zemin at the 15th CCP’s National Congress
addressed the need to construct the socialist state in accordance with the
law (jianshe shehuizhuyi fazhi guojia 建設社會主義法治國家). (4) In recent
years, the Chinese term fazhi 法治 has re-emerged frequently in public dis-
course. Yet, observers of Chinese politics realise that the concept of fazhi
by the Xi administration might not be best captured by the notion of “rule
of law,” but would be better interpreted as “rule by law.” This article is in-
tended to chart the details and implications of legal reform in the broader
context of the pursuit of law-based governance and discusses the notion
of fazhi under Xi’s leadership.
A legal system dominated by the CCP 
The Chinese legal institution is comprised of the Supreme People’s Court
(SPC), the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP), and the Ministry of Public
Security, together with their relevant local agencies. Constitutionally, the Na-
tional People’s Congress (NPC) exerts oversight over the SPC and SPP, but such
oversight is more nominal than substantial. A distinctive feature of China’s
legal system is the presence of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commis-
sion of the CCP and its local Political and Legal Affairs Committees (PLAC) to
ensure the Party’s dominance over the legal system. The PLAC is vested with
extensive power to oversee the courts and other legal institutions at both the
ideological and organisational levels. (5) It has a record of occasionally interfering
in criminal cases, (6) and of allowing the bureau of public security to overshadow
the procuracy and the court in the legal process. (7) The extent of the PLAC’s
power raises concerns about the vulnerability of judicial decisions to undue
external influence as well as the risk of convicting innocent persons given the
urge for local officials to close cases in order to achieve political targets. (8) Ob-
servers point out that judicial corruption and wrongful convictions were par-
ticularly commonplace during the tenure of Zhou Yongkang as Vice-secretary
and Secretary of the Central PLAC (2002-2012). (9)
The presence of the PLAC entails the question of the ambiguous rela-
tionship between the CCP and state laws. As Prof. Fu Hualing argues, the
foundation of the constitutional order in China is the rule of the Party.
This political reality places the Party Constitution over the state Consti-
tution, although CCP cadres are supposed to act in accordance with the
legal framework they have created. (10) In this sense, the CCP politically
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transcends the legal system, and the responsibility for disciplining CCP
cadres lies principally with the Party’s Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection (CCDI). Indeed, incriminated Party cadres are placed under in-
vestigation through an extra-legal procedure called “double designation”
(shuanggui 雙規), where they are held in a “designated place” at a “desig-
nated time” until it is decided whether to expel them from the Party
and/or hand them over to the courts. Prof. Yongshun Cai finds that only
8.7% of the 1,122 CCP members placed under such investigation were
eventually sent to court, and most of them were low-ranking CCP mem-
bers. (11) From this perspective, the high-profile trials of a few former mem-
bers of the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee, such as Bo Xilai and Zhou
Yongkang, indicated the CCP’s tacit consent to hand them over to the
court. 
Taking an instrumental approach to the legal institutions, the CCP has
modified laws and legal institutions over the past decades to keep pace
with its own need for economic reform, maintaining social stability, and
sustaining the Party’s rule. (12) During the initial reform era, economic de-
velopment was central to the development of legal institutions in tandem
with the grooming of a more educated, professional, and capable judiciary
to handle relevant ordinary cases. (13) Judges are also well aware of their as-
signed role to facilitate economic development up until recent times. (14)
Moreover, to alleviate social discontent and thus maintain social stability,
the CCP has allowed citizens and enterprises to litigate in court against the
wrongdoings of the government with administrative laws in place since
1989. (15) However, it is reported that courts tend to reject the registration
of cases of this nature, (16) and less than 10% of the verdicts ruled in favour
of the plaintiffs before 2015. (17)
While legal reform was initially driven to bring the Chinese legal system
in line with international standards, (18) the bottom line of legal reform is
the CCP’s absolute leadership over legal institutions. China’s leaders were
afraid that a judiciary too powerful and independent of the Party’s control
would threaten the CCP’s rule. Characterised by its limited autonomy, the
Chinese judiciary has also long been criticised for its rampant corruption
and unprofessionalism. Scholars also argue that the persistent insufficiency
of financial resources has created a breeding ground for corruption, (19) and
that the practice of recruiting ex-servicemen from the People’s Liberation
Army into the judiciary has hampered the development of professionalism
among judges. (20)
The legal system under pressure in the Hu
Jintao era
Since the early 2000s, the continued development of legal institutions
has been accompanied by a growing number of legal professionals such as
judges and lawyers, especially after the introduction of the judicial exami-
nation system in 2001. The unintended consequence was the increased use
of litigation to protect personal interests or individual rights guaranteed by
the state Constitution. From the early 2000s onward, movements led by
some rights defence (weiquan 維權) lawyers advocated the protection of
citizens’ rights within the constitutional constraints from the bottom up. (21)
The weiquan movement was soon identified as a threat to social stability
and repressed by the government. 
At the same time, the socio-economic situation in China has become
more complex than before with the fast-growing economy. The number of
collective incidents by protestors across the country has increased sharply.
Prof. Sun Liping estimated that as many as 180,000 protests, riots, and other
collective incidents took place in 2010, four times more than the figure a
decade ago. (22) The judiciary soon found itself outmatched by societal de-
mands for social dispute resolution. In order to maintain social stability
(weiwen 維穩), the Hu administration encouraged diversified methods of
dispute resolution, including non-litigation means such as mediation and
administrative reconciliation by non-judicial state agencies to settle social
disputes. (23) For example, “Letters and Visits” (xinfang 信訪) and the “Grand
Mediation” (da tiaojie 大調解) were actively promoted as alternative ways
of settling disputes. (24) Prof. Jacques Delisle argues that such practices have
had a negative impact on the legal system, as the official preference for
mediation over adjudication implies less concern for formal rights and clear
rules. (25)
Moreover, local courts have been under heavy pressure to carry out sta-
bility maintenance, as judges are evaluated in significant part on this
basis. (26) Such pressure has led them to deploy a variety of extra-judicial
means to achieve political targets, such as shaming suspects or convicts in
public despite the fact that the SPC has formally forbidden the use of public
trials since the 1980s. (27)
The crisis of the judicial system has notably resulted in a talent drain that
has been ongoing for ten consecutive years, as many qualified and experi-
enced judges have quit their jobs. (28) Summarised by Prof. Xu Shenjian, the
reasons include enormous pressure from heavy caseloads, poor salaries, lim-
ited opportunities for promotion, intervention by external agencies in the
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adjudication process, etc. (29)Yet, it should be noted that the trend of officials
leaving state positions for an alternative career in the economic market is
not unique to the profession of judges, given the increasing pluralisation of
jobs and greater material rewards offered by the fast-growing economy. (30)
Legal reform as high priority under Xi
Jinping’s leadership
Soon after Xi Jinping took over the CCP’s leadership, the CCP took action
to strengthen Party discipline with a large-scale anti-graft campaign, which
created a favourable environment for reform of the judiciary. (31) The CCP
also promoted the agenda of law-based governance and deepened the ex-
tent of judicial reform at both the Third and Fourth Plenums of the 18th
Party Congress (see Table 1). Legal reform was gradually rolled out in three
phases of pilot projects from June 2014 to January 2016.
Meanwhile, the Xi Administration has shown less tolerance for weiquan
lawyers and bottom-up pressure than that of his predecessors. In July
2015, weiquan lawyers across the country faced an unprecedented, sys-
tematic crackdown, (32) followed by many arrests for “picking quarrels
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The first white paper on judicial reform in the PRC’s history, issued by
the State Council
Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress (9-12 November 2013)
Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP on Some Major Issues
Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform
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The decision that spelled out the details of 
the “Four Comprehensives” after the Third Plenum
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by the Central Leading Group for Deepening Overall Reform
The Fourth Five-year Reform Plan of the People’s Court (2014-2018) 




The first version of the judicial reform plan 
by the Supreme People’s Court
Fourth Plenum of the 18th Party Congress (20-23 October 2014)
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Pertaining to Comprehensively Promoting the Rule of Law
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The decision that set the promotion of law-based governance 
of the country as top priority
Opinion Regarding Comprehensively Deepening Reform 
of the People’s Court




A revised version of the Fourth Five-year Reform Plan of the People’s
Court issued by the Supreme People’s Court after the Fourth Plenum
Fifth Plenum of the 18th Party Congress (26-29 October 2015)
Guidelines to Promote Law-based Governance (2015-2020) 




An outline of a plan for law-based governance jointly published by the
State Council and the Central Committee of the CCP for the first time
White Paper on Judicial Reform of Chinese Courts




A comprehensive summary of judicial reform since the 18th Party
Congress issued by the Supreme People’s Court before the two
sessions of the NPC and NPPCC in March 2016
Table 1 – Important documents related to law-based governance and judicial reform 
under the Xi Administration
Sources: China Daily, Legal Daily (Fazhi ribao), website of the Supreme People’s Court, and Xinhua.
and provoking trouble” and “subversion of state power” in the subse-
quent months. The latest round of legal reform remains a principally
top-down initiative. The essence of the legal reform, as Carl Minzner suc-
cinctly puts it, is focused on the centralisation of control over local
courts and the professionalisation of the judiciary. (33) The following sec-
tions will discuss the two reform directions and analyse the implications
of legal reform.
Centralisation of control over local courts to
curb local protectionism
One significant aspect of legal reform is the transfer of responsibility
for the management of personnel, finance, and property of local courts
from local to provincial governments. Also, Circuit Tribunals (xunhui 
fating 巡迴法庭) have been established as an extended part of the SPC
to deal with court cases that crosscut more than one legal jurisdiction.
Stanley Lubman points out that these reforms are targeted at curbing
the problem of local protectionism. (34) Until now, while the SPC and SPP
have played a supervisory role over local courts and local procurators
respectively, it has been the local government and local Party committee
that has actually controlled the financial and personnel matters of
judges and procurators at the local level. This administrative structure
provides the institutional basis for local protectionism and subjects the
local court and procuracy to the political interests of the local govern-
ment. (35)
In order to keep local protectionism at the doorsteps of the judiciary,
two other reform measures have also been introduced. First, the Case Reg-
istration System (li’an dengji zhi 立案登記制) has been in place since May
2015 to allow courts to accept all reported cases with minimal paperwork,
unlike the previous Case Review System (li’an shencha zhi 立案審查制),
where courts could reject any case due to heavy caseload or to avoid dif-
ficult cases. (36) While the SPC in March 2016 claimed the Case Registration
System a success, with 95% of cases registered successfully, some doubts
over the accuracy of the figures based on other observations have also
been expressed. (37)
Second, the SPC issued two regulations that force judicial officials to com-
pile a database intended to report any persons, either within or outside the
judiciary, who attempt to exert undue influence over the judicial process. (38)
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of this measure might be adversely affected
by the intricate guanxi system, in which networks of personal connections
utilised for personal benefit have long been entrenched in the judicial sys-
tem. (39) Those who have an interest in exerting influence over court cases
are usually relatives, schoolmates, friends, or even superiors of the court of-
ficials who compile the record database.
In short, legal reform aims to leverage the authority of the central gov-
ernment to distance local courts from undue local influence, and thus to
create a greater degree of autonomy for the judiciary to carry out its role
of social dispute resolution as well as stability maintenance. (40) Yet, given
that provincial governments might not have sufficient tools to monitor local
governments, it remains to be seen whether the top-down deterrence to
the negative influence from both external and internal intervention into the
judiciary can be as effective as stated in the above-mentioned legal reforms.
Also, the reform only entails a shift of control from local to provincial gov-
ernments, and the autonomy of the judiciary remains confined by the pa-
rameters set by the central government.
Professionalisation of the judiciary
In tandem with the reform to spearhead a greater degree of autonomy for
the judiciary from local powers, two reform measures under Xi’s leadership
are intended to enhance the professionalism of the judiciary. First, the inter-
nal re-allocation of personnel roles within the courts (faguan yuan e zhi 法
官員額制) has been introduced to set the quota of judges in a reasonable
ratio to other ancillary personnel so as to professionalise the role of judges
and ensure that they are deployed to adjudicate cases and not to an unrea-
sonable amount of administrative work. The judges so recognised after the
personnel restructuring will receive better salary packages as well. Second,
the experimental Judicial Responsibility System (sifa zeren zhi 司法責任制)
allows judges who handle cases in trial to make verdicts and be held respon-
sible for them for their entire careers and beyond. In contrast, the adjudica-
tion process now in place appears to be very bureaucratic. Judges examine
cases in trial, but the final verdict is decided by their administrative superiors,
the Adjudication Committee of each court. (41) The reform with an aim of
“de-administration” (qu xingzheng hua 去行政化) of the court not only en-
hances the personal prestige of frontline judges, but also increases the level
of professionalism of the judiciary by barring high-ranking officials from in-
ternally intervening in cases. Prof. Susan Finder points out that this reform is
oriented towards a “hearing-centred procedural system” that gives rise to a
professional judiciary to deal with technical legal matters. (42)
The reform may nevertheless be hampered by a recent intensification of
the exodus of many qualified judges from the judicial system. Zhu Shaoming
argues that the introduction of the reform on the re-allocation of the judge’s
role has contributed to this phenomenon because the number of legal staff
holding the title of judges will be reduced significantly, and consequently
the number of cases handled by each judge will be sharply increased. (43) In
fact, the nationwide number of newly registered cases handled by local
courts increased sharply from 954,000 in 2013 to 19,511,000 in 2015. (44)
Prof. Jerome A. Cohen also observed that many judges who quit are young
because their career prospects are severely limited by the current reform
that favours older, often less-qualified colleagues. (45)
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Redefining the Party’s control at arm’s
length
The relationship between the CCP and the judiciary is also redefined.
Notwithstanding the continued leadership of the CCP, the PLAC’s control
over the judiciary is to be withdrawn and exercised at arm’s length with an
aim to expanding the degree of autonomy of the judiciary and to enhance
judicial professionalism. The fact that the head of the Central PLAC is no
longer a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo (after the fall
of Zhou Yongkang) could make the retraction of the PLAC’s power easier
to achieve.
According to the reform, local party cadres will be deprived of the author-
ity to nominate local judges and procurators for appointment or removal.
A new Selection Committee led by provincial-level Party cadres and includ-
ing non-Party members will nominate a list of eligible candidates. The sub-
provincial People’s Congress controlled by the sub-provincial party
committee, however, will continue to hold the power to appoint or remove
judges according to the state Constitution, but only by picking from the list
established by the Selection Committee. (46)
The functions of the PLAC are also re-defined. In August 2013, Meng
Jianzhu 孟建柱, the Secretary of the Central PLAC, urged local PLACs to re-
frain from intervening in individual cases. (47) In addition, since July 2015, all
heads of provincial-level PLACs no longer hold the position of heads of
provincial-level public security bureaus, (48) although the two positions remain
held by the same person at the central level. This arrangement is to a certain
extent helpful in preventing the overshadowing of the judiciary by the public
security bureau. The focus of the PLAC has now been redirected toward me-
diating social conflicts and coordinating the interests of various agencies in
the legal system, with stability maintenance as the overarching objective. (49)
Conclusion: The nature of law-based
governance
The latest round of legal reforms is substantial, as the Xi Administration is
attempting to tackle the problems of local protectionism and limited profes-
sionalism of the judiciary by centralising control over local courts as well as
streamlining the professional management of the judiciary. Also, the CCP re-
defined the role of the PLAC and reduced its scope of operations. Yet, in the
pursuit of law-based governance for China, the emphasis remains on the Party’s
leadership, as Prof. Hu Jianmiao points out. (50)
From the perspective of the CCP, the success of legal reform might con-
tribute to the longevity of its rule. First, a professionalised judiciary might
facilitate sustainable economic development in the long run by creating a
business-confident environment and settling commercial disputes effi-
ciently, especially in China’s most developed areas, where economic trans-
actions between strangers have been increasing and people rely less on
guanxi to seal business deals. (51)
Second, while the CCP is not completely forgoing the utility of the non-
litigation mechanism strongly promoted by the Hu Administration, the new
generation of China’s leaders wants to bring the judiciary back to the centre
of social dispute resolution and restore public confidence in its capacity to
deliver fairness and justice, so that it can help relieve pressure for stability
maintenance, especially given the huge demand indicated by the sharp in-
crease in civil case registrations with the courts (see Graph 1). 
Third, the process of judicial centralisation and professionalisation is con-
ducive to the enhancement of the central government’s capacity to monitor
local governments for their failure in public good provision as exemplified
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by the introduction of public interest litigation availed by the new Environ-
ment Protection Law since 2015. Although the de-centralisation of the Chi-
nese political structure has been instrumental in high-speed economic
growth in the past decades, the resulting negative environmental and social
consequences have raised concerns in the central government as increasing
public discontent towards those consequences could undermine the polit-
ical legitimacy of the central authorities. In light of this, the centralisation
of the judiciary is not just a means of strengthening judicial power, but also
an end for the central government to monitor recalcitrant local govern-
ments that refuse to remedy the situation. Developing the state’s capacity
to rule the country according to the law and centralising political power
seem to be two sides of the same coin in terms of the law-based gover-
nance proposed by the Xi Administration. 
The very fact that centralisation of political power is the nature of the
current top-down legal reform implies that the crafted autonomy from local
protectionism and enhanced professionalism of the judiciary can easily suf-
fer from the vertical intervention of the central government when deemed
necessary. For example, in the shadow of the economic slowdown, the ju-
diciary has been subject to national pressure to revive the momentum of
economic growth with the PLAC in place. After all, the development of ju-
dicial autonomy and professionalism is at best secondary to the agenda of
the Party’s sustainable rule. 
Last but not least, the current legal reform sheds light on how China’s
leaders conceptualise the notion of fazhi. As Prof. Fu Hualing argues, the
two-faceted emphasis on the rule-based regulation of the behaviour of
party cadres and the law-based control of the behaviour of government
officials, despite being rhetorical at times, signifies the top leaders’ com-
mitment to the pursuit of a law-based country, which might represent a
tiny step towards “rule of law.” (52) This argument is appealing if we look
at the situation under the Hu administration. Nevertheless, the require-
ment for rule/law-abiding behaviour seems to apply only to the levels
below the central authority. With the continued control of the Party over
the state machinery, and the transcendent position of Politburo members
in the Party, the current legal reform shows that the view of Politburo
members towards fazhi may be better characterised by the notion of “rule
by law,” where the enforcement of law is subject to the top leaders and
they can turn a blind eye to law-breaking behaviour if such a response is
deemed politically desirable. For example, the legal principle of “presump-
tion of innocence” has been frequently compromised in recent times with
the increasing use of televised confessions by state-owned media to de-
nounce suspects who have not yet entered the legal process. (53) In this
light, whether legal reform can really achieve the goal of delivering fair-
ness and justice to every citizen is subject to three conditions: the extent
to which the reforms can curb local protectionism, the level of profes-
sionalisation of the judiciary, and the commitment to such goals by the
central government.
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